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It is widely held that the Red Indians made a big mis-
take by not preventing the Palefaces from immigrating.
The power of the Palefaces - based on their more
developed technologies and a firm belief in cultural and
racial superiority - made the Red Indians virtually
disappear. The lesson from this experience is that the
immigrant countries do not necessarily benefit from
immigration whereas, on the contrary, countries of
origin may pro s per from tr ans fers of wealth as well as
from a decline in the number of the people to be fed.
Nonetheless, in the Western hemisphere of today immi-
gration is considered to be socially as well as economi-
cally beneficial for the immigrant countries and detri-
mental for the countries of origin. This may not be
counterfactual to the historical experience, because - as
opposed to the Palefaces/Red-Indians case - today's
immigrants into the western countries are in general not
endowed with superior productive knowledge and
techniques, although ethnic heterogeneities are still a
common feature.
The immigration issue has attracted a lot of attention
among economists in recent years. The library of the
Institut für Weltwirtschaft Kiel alone comes up with
1244 publications on migration since 1988.' To be sure,
there are many studies catalogued before 1988 and some
are bound to appear after June 1993. As to the first,
ßhagwati [1985] investigated into the global welfare
g a i n s o f f r e e international migration and their regional
d i s I r i b u t i o n; Schatz | 19 8 5 | m a d c s u b s t a n t i a1
reservations on Bhagwati's conclusions. As regards the
most recent publications on this topic we find: Faini and
Venturini, [1993], about the Performance of immigrants,
* Wc want to thank ourcollcaguc Axel D. Neu for valuablc comments and suggcslions.
1 As of June 1, 1993.R.B. Freeman [1993] about the effects of migration on
the native labour force, and M.C. Burda [1993] about
the individual intentions of migrants. A mere two
studies out of the 1244 are devoted to the welfare
effects of immigration on the native residents of the
country of destination [Basu, 1992; Ernst, 1987].
Indeed, immigration is very topical today. With r e -
strictions to e migration out of Central and Eastern
European countries gone, and with tremendous income
differentials existing between Western and Eastern
Europeans a wave of immigration into Western Countries
can be observed. These prospects lend more relevance to
the question of how immigration affects the immigrant
country.
This paper is about the economic calculus of the immi-
grant developed country. It will be analysed whether
migration is detrimental to the welfare of a recipient
country, or whether the divergencies between immigrants
and native residents are rather a source of welfare
increases. The analysis is based on neo-classic economic
theory. Legal or political aspects of immigration will
not be cons idered.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Chapter 1 is
concerned with an evaluation of the effects of diverging
welfare functions of immigrants and native residents;
this analysis will operate with constant factor
Proportions. Vice versa, chapter 2 allows for changing
factor proportion s but assumes welfare functions of
immigrants to be identical to the ones of native resi-
dents. In the final chapter we turn away from macro-
economics and analyse the micro-economics of migration
both in the presence of externalities and without
e x t e r n a 1 i t i e s.Chap'ter I - Immigration Und er Constant Conditions of
-.•:;;.• Pro.d u.ction " - ; ?/•. :%«"•;•* Y'/~ ••• ••;•.''
At a first glance it seems to be hard to argue in favour
of a Situation where the country of immigratiön" cloes not
e x p e r i e n c e, simultaneously w i t h immigratiön, a c h a n g e
in i t s endow m e n t w i t li p r o d u c t i v e I" a c t o r s and, hence, a n
i ncrease in i ts p roduc t i on pos s i b i 1 i t ic s . 11o we vc r, t i n the
case of high 1 y deve 1 oped countries, such as Germany and
the United States, immigratiön is tolerated but at the
same time the ordinary 1 a w forbids many of the
immigrants to look for employment. This may lend some
empirical relevance to the assumption of a constant
factor endowment underlying this chapter.
The traditional macro-'economic model of allocation
allows for two goods whlch in the following will be la-
belled public goods-and Services (= N goods), and pri-
vate goods, (= T goods) respectively; public goods and
Services ine lüde, among others, the supply of external
and internal security. The national optima in the level
as well as in the strueture of prodüction and consump-
tion are attained at point Qo (as depicted in graph 1),
where the curve of prodüction possibi 1 ities ( = BC) is
tangentiäl to one of the social curves of indifference ( =
With respect to the migration issue it can be either
supposed., that immigrants are different from native
residents with respect to preferences (this would repre-
sent the often cited multicultural aspect of migration),
or that they have identical preferences. As regards the
first variant, diverging preferences of immigrants may
prevail in the case of immigratiön from low-income
countries,,' where immigrants are less endowed with pri-
vate goods and, therefore, are more inclined to spend
theirincome on T^ goods rather than to save or to spend
taxes for the prodüction of N goods. In graph 1 this
m u l't i c ültural aspect of migration is illustrated byGraph 1 -
ion
N-Goodsthe diverging indifference curves A of native residents
and h of foreigners.
2
Quite obviously, under conditions of fixed production
functions two points of allocation would be optimal, Qo
for native residents and - hypothetic a 1 ly
3 - Q\ for im-
migrants. Q\ would be equivalent to a decline in welfare
for native residents from rf to h. The same reasoning
applies when comparing Qo with Q\ from the immigrants'
point of view: Qo would represent a decline of
immigrants' welfare from
 1F to
 ll. Let us assume that the
market and political processes will come up with a final
solution between Qo and Q\ say, Qi. The Qi situation
implies that native residents will be worse off than be-
fore migration ('/<'/): the supply of public goods and
services is lower, when compared to their optimal level.
The same reasoning applies for the situation of
immigrants who are worse off in Qi than they could be in
g, (idest:IF <I,,)-4 n \s important to note, that since each of
the parties considered can easily identify the group
responsible for the decline in economic welfare, it may
well be that social conflicts will lead to additional
welfare losses, so that the two groups will eventually
realise third best welfare levels, e.g.
 li and h .
2 The curves imply that native residents prefer to consume relatively more N goods as opposed to
immigrants.
One may also consider in this context that the choice on N goods is basically a collective one - in
contrast to the choice on private goods which is made individually. The result of collective
decision making applies to all, native residents and immigrants. Tilings being as they arc,
immigrants do not have the right to vote until they receive, after due assimilation, citizenship. If
they have the right to vote, their influence on the structure of production will still be uncertain,
because majority voting rules do not produce consistent outcomes under conditions of diverse
preferences.
3 More precisely, Qx indicates what immigrants would have preferred had they actually been
receiving the average citizen's income.
4 It may be argued that this Q2 situation is easier for immigrants from less developed countries to
cope with because their initial situation was much worse than any Q2 situation could possibly
be.In the second case - hypothesising that preferences of
immigrants and native residents are identical and are
represented by the system of /, - the original optimum of
Qo will be maintained. The welfare function ^ will also
include im-migrant.s^, and the production possibility curve
(PC) will - by definition - not be changed. The income
would simply be shared by a larger number of people. In
other words, per capita incomes of native residents
would decline.Chapter II - Immigration Under Changing Conditions
- •-..ofg.Pr.bdiicstj.bn,r .lfi.^:..r ?; : ,t ./"
1 . The basic m.-odef-'-" •>-•••': -* \'-'-'•« • -I-. ~ .:•
Under conditions of free (labour) markets immigration
changes the endowment of a country with productive
factors towards a relative abundance of 1 a b o u"r. Ceteris
pa rib us one would expect a tendency for wage costs to
decline in comparison to the costs of capital.
The effects of a significant inflow of labour on the al-
location of resources, on relative prices, and on- the
structure of incentives will be analysed here in analogy
to the booming-sector model of Corden (1984) a.n;d of
Corden and Neary (1982). The model presupposes a
small open ec Q;rfQ,.m y and operates with two kinds of
goods, namely those goods where world markets have a
major influence (T- goods again) and those goods, whose
prices depend mainly on internal market conditions
(N goods). For the•'• .sake of convenience N goods are
again 'interpreted to-be public goods and services which
are n~bt traded internationally, whereas the T goods are
of the,private kind and tradable.
 :
>
2. Immigrant and domestic labour as perfect substitutes
As a.fijst approximation it will be assumed that immi-
grant labour is technically a close substitute to domestic
labour, but that it will only be employed in the T goods
sector
?. Domestic factors of production are mobile
between the two sectors; thus, the allocation of
indigenous labour is affected by the inflow of foreign
labour. Graph 2 represents basically the same model as
graph I- does, but now immigrant labour adds to the la-
bour force in such a way that production of T goods
5 This bias in employment may be caused by a lack of proficiency in the language of the immigrant
country,cy. by restrictions on the employment of immigrants in the public sector. For example,







 B\. The aggregate indifference curve
compatible with the new production function is h instead
of
 7o. The structure of production is described by Q\
instead of 2o.
Most probably, the level of N goods production will in-
crease because the terms of trade of N goods rise; as a
matter of fact absolute prices for N goods rise, too, be-
cause prices of T goods are still determined by the
world market. Maintaining the assumption that N goods
are to a large extent public goods characterised by non-
rivalry in consumption the negligible effect of immi-
gration on the supply of N goods, as depicted in graph
2, is indeed plausible.
The final outcome of this exercise seems to be that the
economy as a whole is better off after immigration than
before: native residents are not worse off with respect
to public goods, and the production of T goods is
higher. However, total production (Q\) is now shared by
native residents and immigrants.
 f\ is not necessarily
representing a higher level of welfare of the native
residents because it also represents the immigrants'
preferences (for which Arrow-additivity
6 is assumed
here). In other words, per capita welfare of native resi-
dents may decline.
7
3. Immigrant and domestic labour as imperfect substi-
tutes
6 Arrow (1951) found it logically impossible to construct a social welfare function given conditions
of separate preferences. In the previous chapter II we did not deal with Arrow's impossibility
theorem because of the explicit introduction of divergent utility functions. It may be added that
the influx of people being fundamentally different from native residents creates the very
inconsistencies in the outcome of political processes which Arrow's impossibility theorem
hypothesises. In other words, the "brave old world" of social consensus and accountability is
endangered.
7 The policy issue here is whether the total-utility concept of a Benthamite social-welfare function
is valid, or whether the concept of a Millian social-welfare function (maximising average utility)
is preferred (Quibria 1990). We feel that the average citizen of today would find the Benthamite
approach to be too nationalist.a. The multicultural variant
Immigrants normally bring along the knowledge, the
traditions, and the production techniques of their home
countries and, thereby, enhance th,e availability of goods
and services, and add to the culture of the host country
(Sowell 1981).
Non-substitu tabi 1 ity of the factors of production comes
in two variants. The first will be called s o u t h - n o r t h
migration ( = SNM) and the second will be called north-
north migration (= N N M). The SNM variant is character-
ised by immigration of labour which is on average less
productive than domestic labour and/or produces
T goods which are on average in the lower-priced seg-
ments. In other words, it is assumed that wages and,
correspondingly, marginal products are lower when
compared to domestic labour. On the other hand, in the
NNM variant immigrant labour is supposed to be equally
or even more productive than domestic labour.
The SNM case is characterised both by new kinds of
T goods supplied domestically and/or by a lower mar-
ginal productivity of labour in producing the "old" do-
mestic T goods. In order to keep the analysis simple the
production of new and cheap T-goods may also be
translated into a below-average labour productivity of
immigrants. In graph 2, the hypothetical case of immi-
grants producing T goods with domestic productivity
would shift the production-possibility curve from
 BoQ to
B\C(> . The actual lower productivity of immigrants,
however, leads to a rise of the. production-potential of
T goods from
 fio to #i" only. The equilibrium point of
production would then be Qi, where the relative price of
T goods is lower than in Go but higher than in Q\. Given11
the above assumptions, per-capita welfare would be
lower than in Qo or in 2i.
8
In the NNM case immigrant labour is supposed to be
more productive than domestic labour. Immigration will
shift the society's welfare to ^ (with the structure of
production and consumption defined by ft), which is
tantamount to an increase in per-capita income because
additional domestic labour of the same amount would
only lead to an increase in national welfare from A> to V
b. The unproductive immigrant
Under the condition of a basic human right to cross
borders in every direction people may change their lo-
cation simply on the ground that they prefer the en-
dowment of a country with natural resources or with an
infrastructure superior to that of their home country. If
all immigrants are - for whatever reason -econom ica 11 y
unproductive, the short-run equilibrium point will stay
in Qo (still graph 2). However, domestic labour will have
to share its income with immigrants. For example, native
residents would have to pass on (
Bo~
B4) or (C0-C4) of
T goods, or N goods respectively, to the immigrants.
The absorption possibility curve of domestic citizens
would thus decline from
 fi0Q to ^-A. Still referring to
graph 2, production will stay at Qo whereas the new point
of domestic citizens' consumption will shift to Q*. Id est,
consumption of (
B -
 B) T goods or of {
c\~
c) N goods will
be taken over by immigrants. In analogy to the Corden-
Neary model this result resembles a net outflow of
resources (capital, labour, or natural resources) for
which the country of origin receives no equivalent
return.
This conclusion holds for a remuneration of labour according to its marginal product only. The
case of imperfect labour markets is discussed in chapter 3.2 below.Chapter III - Microeconomics of Migration
1. The traditional market model
The traditional neo-classical market model with no ex-
ternalities and non-distorted incentive structures pro-
vides a straightforward approach for analysing immi-
gration.
Graph 3 represents the ordinary labour market equilib-
rium of the domestic economy in the sector of the
(internationally) traded T-goods production.
9 In this
economy
 ss' describes the domestic supply of labour;
supply rises with the wage rate until
 Ej , where the total
domestic labour potential is absorbed ("full employ-
ment").
 DD> represents the firms' demand for labour,
reflecting their marginal productivity of labour as de-
rived from the production function. In the absence of
migration labour-market equilibrium will be at the full-
employment level and at the wage rate
 w/. After opening
the domestic labour market for a free inflow of labour
the new equilibrium will be at (^max >
wi), given that in the
small-economy case the supply of foreign labour can be
described by an infinitely elastic supply curve (FS)(FS)'.
Domestic labour will lose on two grounds: Its wage rate
declines from
 UV to
 w\, and its employment declines from
Ef to Ef The amount of immigrant labour would be
What are the welfare effects of an opening of the econ-
omy for foreign labour? The traditional Hicksian calcu-
lus would suggest that, while domestic labour will lose
domestic producers would gain
This implies thai the price of T goods is determined by the world market.13
Graph 3 -


















dom/s dom Ex L E E Labour f t max s(2) AP-a + b + c + d + e + f.
Foreign labour, in this model, is not supposed to
 fp'fo*'fit
because perfect competition ensures that the interna-
tional; wage rate just compensates for the displeasures
incurred by work, and rnigration.-
Thereby, the change in total domestic economic welfare
is defined by:
(3) &Wdom=b + c + d + em '
: " ..
This outcome at the sa*me time represents the change in-
world welfare due to the liberalisation of the national
labour market. " - -•
2. Approximations to the real world -. "
The above applied neo-classical paradigm is an over-
simplification. In the real world, basic assumptions of
the neo-classical model do not hold. In o.rder to arrive at
what the old Greeks called a Oecopia^ i_e. a condensed
form of reality, the model has to be adjusted for facts"
which are obvious and seem to be crucial for assessing
the impact! of migration today. In reality* there :is,;nei--
ther a completely closed national labour-shop system-
nor a-, completely free immigration system. In addition,-
distortions'of incentive structures on labour markets are
the rule rather than the exception; domestic and foreign
labour are non-pe rfecl substitutes; governments in tor fere'
with m ig rat ion in many ways; the average immigrant has.,
preferences which are often quite different from the
o ne s o f the* ay c rage native resident; last but by no mcans
least, the national welfare function may contain strains
on* t,lie na t ura I r-esource" base as an argument, most of all
in regions- which are a'-lready detise ly pop~u lated.
In the following paragraphs we shall try to capture some
of these factors by modifying the neo-classical model.
a . P a r t i a I d i s c r i m i n a t i o n o f i m m i g r a n t s15
In order to regulate immigration, governments have
applied a multitude of measures. Among these are
quantitative restrictions such as prohibition of immi-
gration, e.g. in the case of Mexicans entering the United
States of America, or legal provisions preventing
immigrants from applying for work, e.g. in the case of
Germany; or legal provisions allowing only those
foreign applicants to immigrate who are supposed to
have scarce skills, e.g. in the case of Australia. At the
same time there is also the phenomenon of subsidisation
of immigration in all those cases where immigrants
receive social welfare payments or benefit from the
material infrastructure of the immigrant country.
In paragraphs a and P we shall focus on two stylised
variants of negative and positive discrimination of
immigrants.
a. Restrictive immigration policy
We assume here that the domestic government imposes a
tax (t) on immigrant labour; the case of a purely
quantitative restriction can be inferred from this tax
model. Still in graph 3, the tax on the immigrant wage
rate raises domestic wages from
 w\ to
 w,. Immigration is
thereby reduced to (
E<~




 Et, that is up to the full employment level
f o r (I o m e s t i c labour. The labour m a r k e t c q u i I i b r i u in
w i I h ou t i min i gra t ion policy was ( ^,,,.,» '
 w\). The eq u i I i b r i u m
with immigration policy is (
E,>
w,). The welfare effects of
this policy are:
(4) AP = -a-b-c-di
(5) ALJom = + a5
(6) AG = +cj
where AG refers to the change in government reve-
nues.16
The change in total domestic economic welfare thus
amounts to
(7) ^Vdom=-b-d ,
which also represents the change in world welfare.
1
0
Comparing (7) with (3) reveals that the described im-
migration policy, although welfare decreasing with re-
spect to no immigration policy, is superior to the
situation of no immigration at all (by the amount of c +
e).
As regards an immigration policy employing quantitative
restrictions instead of taxes, the results change only
slightly. In case no domestic citizen or institution
profits from the rents provided by the quota,
(8) AC = 0
and
Thereby, welfare declines more on account of the quota
rent than in the immigration-tax case.
p. Expansive immigration policy
History offers many examples of immigration policies
which aim at a positive discrimination of immigrants. In
the following the effects of an immigration wage
subsidy, which is de facto the mirror image of the above
discussed immigration tax model, is analysed. Graph 3
also exemplifies the results of an immigration subsidy:
1
0 It is interesting to note that immigrants contribute to national welfare by the amount of area c (not
included in the analysis of welfare changes because e represents no change); domestic labour
contributes to national welfare the equivalent of the areas (m + f).1 /
In comparison to a situation of a free immigration
[defined by (^^I)] the new equilibrium is (
E*>
w*).
From this it follows that
(10) M
3 = g1+u + r + n + o + p + qt
(11) ALdom=-g1-a.
Foreign labour is still subject to the above mentioned
"displeasures of migration and work" equivalent to
 w\.
Competition among immigrants ensures that the wage
level
 wi drops by the amount of the immigration-subsidy
rate, s, to ^:
(12) AG = —u-r-n-o — p — q-Vf
(13) A^om=-M-v.





With hindsight, the results on positively or negatively
discriminating migration policies are not surprising:
Any migration policy reduces welfare, no matter whether
it taxes or subsidises immigration. Similar to analyses
of national or international trade policies the first best
policy is not to interfere with the free movement of
labour (or goods), at least in the absence of externali-
ties and regulated markets, and of heterogeneity of
skills and of consumers' preferences.
b. Immigrants and regulated labour markets
a. The case of the highly productive immigrant
History offers many examples of countries losing some
of their scarce and highly productive labour force, such
1
1 In a completely linear world welfare losses (b •+ d) are equal to (u + v).18
as Germany in the wake of World War II, or Sweden
during its high taxation decades in the second half of
the 20th Century. On the other hand there are at the
same time countries which select from the supply o f
immigrants those who are supposed to be highly pro-
ductive. The method of "picking the winners" may vary
between the American way (such as the "Operation Pa-
perclip") and the Australian approach (where immigrants
have to meet certain skill requirements).'
2
In Graph 4a we present the model lor analysing the case
of highly productive immigrants entering a country with
a regulated labour market. Wages are fixed at level
 wr
leading to domestic employment of £/ .
 Er~
Er of the do-
mestic labour force is unemployed on account of the
wage regulation. Foreigners applying for immigration
are supposed to produce at a level of marginal
productivity of
 Ml\- . For reasons of simplicity it is as-
sumed that the opportunity wage of immigrants is
 wr, i.e.
the domestic full employment wage in the absence of
regulations. The highly productive immigrants receive
the fixed wage
 wr. In view of their marginal productivity
this would be equivalent to a subsidy for domestic
producers of the amount of {
MPF~
wr). Immigrants thereby
receive an "effective wage" of
 w/ . At their effective
wage the firms employ ( ^F ~ ^m) foreigners. Domestic




labour has a marginal product of
 MPF, too). The welfare




2 At a first glance immigration into the Americas in the wake of Columbus or others is of the same
highly productive nature. It should be reminded, however, that the American native residents (i.
e. the Red Indians) of that time did not pursue any policy of picking the winners. In fact, they do
not seem to have profited at all due to the ensuing dramatic changes in the natural resource base.Graph 4 -






b) The Case of Low-Productivity Immigrants and
Regulated Labour Markets
Labour20
(15) AL,..=c + d + f + h + ii ' •••• -"•"" ""
From this" follows a change in domestic welfare of native
residents -••-. •.•.'-. •• '">.•;• •+•,"• > ~-
(17a) MVnr=d-f.-g, ' • •;'•/
which should be negative in most instances. Calculating
the welfare change of total domestic residents, native
and foreign, leads to
(175) AWlr=c + 2d + i + h-g^ 4 ' •"'%.•••
which should be positive in most instances. In other
words: immigrant supply of highly productive labour on
regulated labour markets raises the welfare of immi-
grants the most, whereas the native labour force loses
i n c o rrTe .
p. The case of the low-productivity immigrant
This case is described by graph 4b.
 MPF is below the
fixed minimum wage level. Consequently, immigrant
1 abou r,, b_eiag.r,les s,, p reduc t-i.ve. ...w i 11- f ind no... -jpb. t;a't ;'the
regulated wage
 wr,. This seems to contradict the empiri-
cal fact of mass' i"rrimigration frorri less developed into
highly-developed economies,
1
3 such as the US., on Ger-
many. In the" case of the US., however, labour markets
are not as heavily regulated; moreover, a large part of
immigration is illegal, as is employing illegal immi-
grants. As regards Germany, the analysis does not help
to account for mass-immigration (cf. p. 15 f.), but it
may serve to explain why German trade unions never
actually have opposed immigration (instead, they have
demanded that; foreign labour should not be discrimi-
nated against and receive the negotiated wage rate). Part
of the immigrants from low productivity countries is not
1
3 Immigrants from LDCs can be'supposed to have a productivity which is close to the average
labour productivity in their home country.allowed to work in these countries anyway, and part
joins the - illegal - black-labour market.
y. Conclusions
The analysis has shown that even in the case of regu-
lated labour markets the native workers tend to lose
when foreign labour immigrates, be it more or be it less
productive than native labour.
c. The case of an over-exploitation of the resource base
a. The natural resource base
The technical and economic characteristics of natural
resources are manifold. Natural renewable or non-renew-
able resources owned by native residents and, therefore,
priced adequately, will experience a price increase
concomitant with a decreasing endowment per head due
to the population growth caused by immigration. Price
increases per se are not welfare-relevant. Quite another
issue is the case of those natural resources owned by the
state that - for technical reasons or due to policy
failure - are not adequately priced. A main feature of
these natural resources of a country is that they are of
the common-pool kind. Up to a certain level, additional
exploitation has no negative consequences
("externalities") for further exploitation. Beyond that
level additional use of the resource r(aises private costs
and, more importantly, social costs of additional
exploitation, present or future. Availability of
(national) natural common-pool resources is different
among countries, depending, among others, on the stage
of economic development, on the degree of homogeneity
of the population, or on the density of population. In
certain countries, such as Australia with a vast resource
base, immigrant labour may in fact increase the social
product by more than the i mm i g ran I s' o w n i n co ine s .
Other and more crowded countries, such as II o n g K o n g ,
may feel detrimental effects of immigration on society's22
welfare. From this reasoning it follows that there exist
optima of population. Population growth beyond the
o p t i m u m level would reduce welfare.
Graph 5 describes a stylised case of over-exploitation of
the natural resource base induced by immigration. The
domestic equilibrium is the same as in those graphs
above which referred to unregulated labour markets.
Immigrant labour can be hired at marginal costs-of ^V,,.r
(= private marginal costs of foreign labour). Over-ex-
ploitation of the natural resource base (in the absence
of an appropriate pricing of resource use) can be inter-
preted as a cost to society arising in addition to what
private firms have to pay to foreign and domestic la-
bour. With a grain of salt
1
4 this can be illustrated by a
social supply curve of
 MCr,soc, which is above the private
supply curve of foreign labour.
The algebra of graph 5 is the following: Resource costs
of immigration are equivalent to the areas f+b + c + g + d + e,
since (
Eequ,pr ~
Edom,Pr )immigrants cause social costs of t per
capita. Government can improve the situation by raising
a tax of t = (
MCF.soC-
MCi-:Pr), thereby raising domestic
employment to ^m,™ and decreasing immigration to
(
Eequ,Soc-
Edom,scc). The welfare calculus is the following:
(18) AP=-a-f-b-c-d-e^
(1 9) &




4 It is assumed here that (1.) the labour participation rate is constant and the same for all situations
and for native residents and foreigners, (2.) the strategic variable is immigration; this is close to
reality because constitutions normally provide the right of citizenship to native residents only;
(3.) resource costs per immigrant arc constant.Graph 5 -
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and
(2 1 ) AG = c + d.
To ta:l
v domestic' welfare is increased by the amount of
(f+g) due to the tax on immigration.
(3. The material infrastructure
It is often argued that immigration puts a strain, on the.
domestic material infrastructure because of the induced,
need for additional schools, hospitals, streets, police
etc. These arguments are partly of a short-run nature; in;
the longer run the infrastructure will adjust to the addi-
tional requirements - i.e. if all things are equal the,
shares of immigrants' incomes devoted to the national'
infrastructure will be the same as it had been before!
(and still will be) for the native residents alone. . "
Things are different in all those cases were immigrants"
absorb a higher share of the infrastructure than native
residents'. For example, it has been argued that the crime
rate of immigrants with respect to major offences
against the law is patently higher than the crime rate of
native residents (Neu 1984). At a first glance, the latter"
phenomenon seems to be a case of social costs of
immigration exceeding private costs, as depicted in
graph 5. Again, the policy solution in order to avoid
welfare, losses would be a tax on immigration rather than;
raising taxes both on native residents and on immi-
grants. The obvious difference between the two cases is,
that natural resources are exhaustible and the infra-;
structure is not., This difference is important: In the"
case of deplorable natural resources immigrants do nor
automatically pay for the resource cost of immigration.
In the case of a renewable infrastructure general taxes
levied on all employees would provide for the supply of
the additional infrastructure, implying a permanent
decline in disposable per-capita incomes.Chapter IV - Conclusions
In a truly neo-classical world, with no substantial differ-
ences between immigrants and native residents, free mi-
gration is welfare increasing for the native residents of the
immigrant country. In contrast to this ideal world the real
world is more complex. Our findings suggest that in the
real world, in order to exploit positive welfare effects
accruing to an economy which opens its labour markets to
foreign labour, interventions are necessary.
It is noteworthy that the analysis indicates that subsidies
on immigration are generally not warranted and that, on the
other hand, the immigration-tax case is easier to sub-
stantiate in the case of bottlenecks of the natural or mate-
rial infrastructure. Anyway, the design of an i n ter ven toni s t
policy would have to take into account the degree of ho-
mogeneity of preference patterns, the changes in the do-
mestic production patterns, the degree of substitutability of
domestic labour for foreign labour, the labour-participation
rate, the existence of regulated labour markets, and the
availability of natural resources. To be sure, there may be
intrinsic information problems coming up which make
consistent immigration policies impossible. Given that
superior knowledge in these matters is non-existent a
viable solution may be gained by asking the constituency
on the optimal size of population.
It is important to note that our analysis is of the compara-
tive-static kind. The e f f e c t ( s ) of immigrant labour on eco-
nomic growth and on structural change at large in ay be
more important than the static effects alone. As to the
growth effects of immigration, analysts seem to come up
with divergent results. Whereas Johnson (1993) attributes
positive growth effects to immigration into the United
States, G a lor/Stark (1993) seem to suggest negative growth
effects on account of a decline in the endowment with
human capital per capita. Indeed, it may be argued that any
inflow of low-skilled labour into highly-developed
countries lowers -along with a decrease of labour26
productivity - the incentives for capital deepening as well
as for introducing new technologies. Japan may serve as an
example here: What kind of immigration policies have been
pursued in a country producing at the high-technology
frontier for so many years?Literature
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